Commissioned Papers for the Regional Workshops
Democracy Forum 2000

Democracy and Poverty: Participation

by Madhukar S.J.B.Rana

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Introduction

South Asia is in the grip of a multifaceted crises extenuated by the poor quality of governance and its inability to grapple with the challenges of population explosion, poverty and deprivation, social exclusion, rapid urbanization, and environmental degradation caused by the very forces of development.

The symptoms of this multifaceted crises are seen in the rise of political and social violence, militarization of society, pervasive political graft and corruption, youth alienation, and, indeed, the undoing of democracy itself with the peaceful overthrow of an elected government by the military establishment for mal-governance, as happened recently in Pakistan. What has happened in Pakistan also clearly suggests that the people’s faith in electoral democracy is not high there.

With a population of 1.3 billion or around 22% of the world population the challenge to governance in South Asia is immense. The task ahead is made more complex by the regional diversity borne out of its multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-linguistic and multi-cultural composition. Furthermore, around 550 million or about 45% of the world’s poor people are to be found in South Asia and have yet to fully enjoy the fruits of democracy and development.The poor are either out of the mainstream of development as chronically marginalized people or face the hardships on account of anti-poor policies, priorities and institutions.

The lack of democratic participation and its relation to poverty in South Asia can be seen in terms of ineffective political parties, local governments, national parliaments, civil society and civil service. In addition, the lack of dynamic and visionary political, bureaucratic and business leadership also serve to retard the extent of democratic participation in South Asia.

The Social Structure of South Asia: Status of the Non-Elite

The common challenge to all the nation-states of South Asia is how best to re-organize their nations-within-states for all to find their identity and participate in democracy and development.In a record of about 50 years of national consolidation, following the departure of the British from the region, it appears that the nation-states of South Asia are not yet stabilized as one whole political entity since sub-nationalism is on the rise everywhere with the exception of the Maldives. The foundations of sub-nationalism are caste, tribe, religion and language as minorities seek to exert their cultural identity, have a fair share in the national economy and be duly represented in the body politic. In the case of Afghanistan and Sri Lanka sub-national hostilities have developed into civil wars with no immediate solution in sight.

By ‘caste system’ we mean a Hindu hiearchical system of social relationships rendering power, privilege and influence based on birth and hereditary relationship to other groups.

Castes have sub-castes depending on the extent of social mobility and rigidity of traditions within a community. Caste-based politics is most rife in India, with strong potential for its presence in Nepal too. According to G.H. Peiris, "…the persistence of bleak conditions among people in this segment of society could be regarded as the principal problem of governance relating to caste-based identities, given India’s enduring commitment to the egalitarian ideals" (Ibid. P.295). Typically, a rural Indian village is estimated to have as many as twenty or more castes contained within it and seldom does a dominant caste exceed 20% to 25% of the population.

It is estimated that 450 caste groups belong to the Scheduled Caste (SC) to comprise 16% of the Indian population. Relatively high SC population are to be found in northern India such as Punjab (28.3%), Himachal Pradesh (25.3%), West Bengal (23.6%), Bihar (22.0%) and Uttar Pradesh (21.1%). Status variations exist even within the SC as one group considers another as untouchable.

Similarly, the ‘Forward Caste’(FC) is estimated to comprise of 17.6 % of the population to include Brahmin, Rajput, Thakur, Maratha, Jat, Patel, Banyia, Kayastha, Lingayat, Reddy, Vokkalinga, Kamma, Bhumihar etc. This, therefore, means that anywhere between 66-67% of the population of Hindus in India corresponds to the Shudra of the Chaturvarna system. These shudras have now opted for the newly identified status as ‘Other Backward Caste’ (OBC) in view of their poverty.

Tribal people are those living outside the Hindu hierarchy, often belonging to a specific territory with political claims to exclusive rights to their own homeland. Tribal culture is characterized by animism, hunting, slash and burn agricultural cultivation, nomadic herding of livestock, and communal ownership of land.

Tribals are located in the harsh environmental conditions of the Hindu Khus-Himalayas or the Deccan plateau or the Rajasthan deserts. Tribalism has provided a fertile ground for armed militancy in the form of the Maoist revolts of Bangladesh, India and Nepal. The famous Naxalite movement of West Bengal first involved the Santal tribe in India’s Darjeeling District bordering Bangladesh and Nepal.

Tribals are the poorest of the poor in South Asia. In 1991, in India it is estimated to have comprise 67.8 million; in Pakistan 13 million; in Bangladesh 1.2 million, and in Nepal around 1,5 million. In Sri Lanka no more than a few thousand are tribal. In all, it is estimated that about 8% of the people of South Asia belong to one tribe or another. Within North East India the tribal presence is much more significant. It has an array of 209 tribes using 175 Tibeto-Burman languages and, as per the 1991 Indian census, one finds that the ratio of tribal to total population are as follows: Mizoram 95%; Nagaland 88%; Meghalaya 86%; Arunachal Pradesh 64%; Manipur 34%; Sikkim 22% and Assam 13%.

By all accounts the North-East states of India remain a neglected region as it lags significantly behind the rest of India in terms of per capita income, backwardness in agriculture, and infrastructure. So much so that ‘liberation’ is the watchword of many of the North East Indian peoples— liberation from the domination by other ethnic groups; the preservation of their cultural identity, and the betterment of the material conditions of living.

Even as the North East have their own statehood the underlying belief appears to be, paradoxically, that an essential pre-condition for the achievement of these objectives is further political autonomy. Thus casting grave doubts as to whether a federal structure with unitary features, as in India and Pakistan, adequately protects the rights of its citizens against those of the nation-state.

What is not, yet, realized by the North East states of India is that their economic backwardness can only be overcome through regional integration by the creation of a new growth zone in the eastern seaboard of South Asia to jointly harness the Himalayan resources and integrate the transport, power, tourism, trade and environmental policies and institutions.

Towards this, Nepal’s proposal for the establishment of a SAARC Growth Quadrangle (SAARC-GQ) by and between parts of Bangladesh, Bhutan, North East India, and Nepal should be pursued with greater speed and vigour by all governments, private sector and civil society. Poverty, deprivation and backwardness in the region encompassing the eastern seaboard of South Asia can best be eradicated through sub-regional co-operation which, in turn, will lead to co-operation with other adjacent sub-regions of Asia. And the creation of further growth centres encompassing the adjacent Central and South East Asian landmass (Rana:1998a).

Then there is the vast magnitude of Muslim religious minority of India, who comprised 12% of the population or 120 million in 1991. Being landless they are engaged in petty trade, handicrafts and as artisans. The bulk of the urban poor of India are Muslims, who are critically dependent on wage employment for their survival. Educational backwardness amongst the Muslims is the prime reason for their disadvantaged position as compared to the other poor minorities through entrapment in an endless legacy of inter-generational poverty.

South Asia is in dire need of policy innovations to include into the development mainstream the lower castes, tribals and Muslim peoples. Social inclusion has been attempted through a policy of reservation, which has failed to uplift the minorities.

Reservation has not led to particiaption. Reservation has not made any dent on the lives of the ultra-poor who happen to be these minorities. On the contrary, it has enshrined casteism constituionally and politically — something that was to have been outlawed once in for all. What was to be a transitional policy for ten years has lasted, in India, for nearly 50 years. More is being asked for by all to defeat its real purpose, namely to end social segregation through the practice of untouchability, and to provide access to public places like wells, schools, offices and temples to lower caste people.

Reservation has compromised the principle of merit and competition to the detriment of quality and efficiency in the delivery of public service. It has led to unprecedented political patronage of the leadership of the poor, and to acts of extreme populism to manipulate electoral results. So pervasive has this mentality for quotas become in India that now even the upper castes are demanding reservation for reasons of their poverty – not backwardness-- for access to public jobs, educational seats and appointments to political office. Now Muslim and Christian minorities too are demanding quotas on the principle of equity and equality before the law. Demand for this kind of reservation policy is finding a platform in Nepal too as economic opportunities for the poor have remained stagnant and the patronage of the state mounts.

Reservation does not provide social mobility, only social inclusion for those politically privileged amongst the SC. What began as means of granting favours to chosen sections of the public in British India’s broader policy of divide and rule has now created a Pandora’s box of conflict, confusion and compromise over its purpose and objectives, and over its nature and scope. The widening of the social net of reservation to all backward communities (which India’s Mandal Commission estimated to be 52% of its population) to the extent of 49% of all governmental jobs and places in educational institutions have led to violent reaction by the forward castes that is unprecedented in the history of caste relations in India.

This policy has, thinks G.H. Persis, "intensified the tripartite rivalry between Upper Castes, Other Backward Castes and Schedule Castes, and has enhanced the impact of the cross-currents of caste rivalry in not only electoral politics but also on other forms of violent confrontation, especially in situations where the three groups or any two among them appear to be evenly matched" (Panandiker: P.299). It is expected that as this confrontation and violence grows revolutionary movements such as Maoism will increasingly seek to mobilize the SC and OBC groups for armed revolt against the state, as has been happening in Andra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa., and that is now taking place in the far west of Nepal with great momentum.

Perhaps the best indicator of the multifaceted crises facing South Asia is the rise of violence. We have premised that the rise of violence is a powerful indicator of the `multiple crises inflicting South Asian states and communities. According to Ved Marwah " The rise in violence is due to many factors: economic, political and social. Most of them are interrelated and directly linked to the decline in the quality of governance. The instruments of governance are becoming increasingly partisan, corrupt and ineffective" (Panindiker: P 229). According to the Human Development Report,1999 " Violence thrives in poor societies where politics is weakly institutionalized, law and order is fragile and where the parallel economy is strong. South Asia, at least for the moment, fits the bill perfectly" (Ibid: P 43).

The culture of political violence is epitomized in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi in India; Liaquat Ali Khan in Pakistan; Solomon Dias Bandaranaike and Ranasinghe Premadasa in Sri Lanka; Mujib ur Rehman and Zia ur Rahman in Bangladesh. It is not over as has been witnessed by the recent attempted assassination of President Chandrika Kumaratunga of Sri Lanka. Equally symbolic of political violence are the death in mysterious circumstance of President General Zia ul Haq of Pakistan, the hanging of Prime Minsiter Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and, now, the trial for high treason of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The politics of violence, coupled with the lack of intra-party democracy and excessive state patronage, is at the core of dynastic politics in South Asia.

The trajectory of violence began on the grounds of religion with the partitioning of India in1947. The seeds of Hindu-Muslim conflict were sown then and continues to reach new heights of fanaticism and hatred. Religious violence has, in turn, been compounded by other forms of violence such as ethnic, social and political.

Ethno-nationalism in the North Eastern states of India and Bangladesh and the North Western provinces of Pakistan originate in the glaring neglect for balanced regional development of the hinterlands together with, as in India and Bangladesh, the mass migration of ethnic Bengalis into the tribal homelands to exert a position of dominance of the local cultures. Ethno-nationalism has also been fueled by externally-generated support to revolt against the state for independence or self -rule.

Democracy itself can fuel political violence. This takes place where electoral politics thrives on demagoguery. Where leaders mislead followers through populist rhetoric to garner votes by raising people’s expectations beyond reason only it has proven to be counterproductive as the youth are angered, frustrated and eventually alienated from the political process. In an atmosphere of political violence the rule of law is the first casualty.

In our present age of the information, transportation and communication revolutions social changes are so rapid that conflict between tradition and modernity are difficult to manage be it in the household, community or state. Social violence have erupted as the elite lose out on its traditional hold over power, prestige, control and influence. Youth unemployment, at such times, compounds the propensity for violence and serves as the fountainhead of social violence and crime. " Islamic fundamentalist groups in Pakistan, like similar religious groups in other countries in South Asia, provide frustrated youths with new hopes of acquiring pride, confidence and sense of purpose with the identification of their movement and purpose with a holy cause" (Marwah:Ibid. P 233).

Social violence also takes place because the security agencies are not trusted by the people as they are seen to represent the ruling elite only. As a result, armed community groups are formed to protect one’s own community. This happens because public institutions are caste-based, politicized, and largely dominated by a few ethnic communities. Furthermore, the structure of cities needs to be understood for their propensity to organized violence as " one-third of Delhi’s population lives in slums. The situation is worse in Bombay and Karachi. It is not much better in Dhaka…The rise of slum lords in South Asian cities is a common phenomenon. They enjoy political protection because of their links with political parties. They provide crowds for organizing processions, meetings, rallies and strikes. …The city structures need reform" …Organized crime plays an important role in the influential film industry, trade unions and real estate development in Bombay; and in transport, real estate and drug trafficking in Karachi. The rise of violence can not be checked without breaking this nexus through all possible legal and political means" (Ibid. P 261).

The Poverty of Democratic Governance: Elite’s Mistrust of the People

Centralization of powers is at the core of bad governance. The chronic reluctance to delegate, deregulate and decentralize authority at the centre for fear of losing control makes it all the more difficult for devolution of responsibility to different layers of governance.

Actually, the reluctance to decentralize to local governments is a British imperial legacy stamped solidly on the psyche of the national bureaucracies of South Asia. The entire architecture of the civil service with its ministries, departments, and the service cadres created to man these organizations, derails the functioning of local governments.

Mistrust of the people is to be seen most eminently in the powers of supression of local governments by the centre that has been profusely wielded as in the instances of India and Pakistan. What we see from historical evidence is that local governments are seen as ‘second class governments’ in regimes with multiparty democracies, as in India, and as ‘agents of democratic legitimacy’, as with the non-party military and monarchical regimes of Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan

In Nepal, under the monarchical, partyless regime, local governance was to be completely mistrusted as hotbeds of party politics despite one of the fundamental tenants of the partyless political system being decentralization. So, too, political parties are reluctant to decentralize for fear of losing control as national parties and because of the fear of intra-party democratization among its leaders. (Rana: 1998c).

Lord Montague, an ardent democrat, had hit upon the imperial and bureaucratic mindset when he said in 1870 "in my opinion, the root cause is the profound distrust shown by the civil servant of the India, and the Indian of the civil servant. The consequence is that the civil servant, rather than trust the righteousness of his own cause, ties himself up and everybody else with rules, regulations and other safeguards. The Indian then sees that he is not trusted and uses his powers irresponsibly knowing that the civil servant has guarded itself by its regulations. I feel half inclined to suggest that we should sweep away all regulations and statutes". In the words of Shivaramakrishna," This insight into the Indian administrative system is valid in the sub-continent as much today … In all successive efforts of reform this distrust of the people and over reliance on regulations has characterized local as well as other levels of government" (Panandiker:P 419).

Lord Ripon, Viceroy of India, a lone visionary in 1882 said " if local government is to have any vitality then it should evolve out of local circumstances. If it has to be created artificially, at least it should be planned in detail by local administrators and not be imposed readymade by the state government" The same ethos could apply to the machinations of the donor communities, which has been described by some to be a new form colonialism, that of "aid colonialism" (Greta Rana: 1984a). The system of ‘guardianship’ whether by the Governor Generals in British India or by the Foreign Ministries of Donor Countries or the Boards of Governors of International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Asian Development Bank remains, in essence, similar in spirit if not letter to what Lord Ripon had perceived in 1882.

Concrete examples of centralization by the World Bank, supported by the bilateral donor community, are to be witnessed in the creation of ‘multipurpose’ and ‘special purpose authorities’ which have actually eroded the concept of pluralism as, for example, the creation of urban development authority, telecommunications authority, electricity authority, civil aviation authority, water and sewerage authority and the like.

Actually, the donor community have done so for their own convenience to suit their needs for loan provision, disbursement, monitoring and evaluation. Presumably, citizen’s rights over entitlement of basic municipal services was to be safeguarded by the ‘goodness’ of the international and national civil servants working in tandem with each other. In the quest for the elusive ‘economies of scale’ through the creation of monopoly-ridden behemoths that have proven to be bastions of bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, and nurturers of political graft and misrule, one sacrificed ‘economies of scope’ through a multitude of organizational innovations for service delivery, as also for safeguarding consumer sovereignty based on the integrity of market forces.

Nowhere is South Asia in need of devolution as in municipal governance. Random urbanization is one of the core sources of bad governance. The reality is this: South Asia is as rural as it is urban. This is manifest in the fact that much less than 30% of GDP in 1995 was contributed by agriculture. Similarly, total urban population was 287 million or 26% in 1991, and it is expected to comprise 429 million or 31% in 2000; 644 million or 39% in 2010 and 883 million or 47% in 2020. ‘Back to the Village’ national campaigns, as took place in Nepal during the 1961-90 period, or the assertion that ‘ our country lives in its villages’ so commonly heard in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan could be nothing more than electoral populism by the rural elite or "just another manifestation of the romance with the rural" believes Sivaramakrishna (Panandiker :P 410).The service sector could be contributing well beyond 40% in the same period., whereas the contribution of the industrial sector could be around 17%. Henceforth cities, towns and urbanized villages are going to be the core dynamic centres of economic and social change in the next two decades. Without appropriate devolution, municipal governance will continue to be a major problem of governance in South Asia and possibly the harbinger of the forces of, what may be euphemistically called " the other globalization", namely money laundering, and trafficking in drugs, guns and humans.

Without fiscal autonomy devolution becomes a chimera, especially in the wake of the centralized civil and security national service cadres. Where allegiance and loyalty of the bureaucracy is to the centre, it is hard to implement local autonomy. Hence commensurate ministerial and departmental re-structuring and re-engineering are needed, including downsizing of the central cadres, if devolution is going to be for real. Local civil service cadres should be created on say five-year renewal contract basis restricted to "sons and daughters" of the soil with permanent residency in the communities. True decentralization should encourage local conditions of work and wages so that local loyalty and competition could be guaranteed. (By the same token, recruitment into the national service should be open to all on the basis of merit).

Devolution would necessitate the separation of the nature of electoral politics to be demarcated between local, federal and national issues. To have them mixed up as one whole is causing problems of relevance and choice for the electorate. What does WTO have to do with community drinking water, fodder and fuel, for example?

Similarly, the political horse-trading between MPs in the different tiers of governance must be broken to force then to be transparent and accountable to their electoral constituency as a whole, and not only to those who voted him or her into positions of power. Once elected, under a winner-take-all system, the MP is everybody’s MP and not only MP of a particular party. Thus once elected he or she wears two hats— legislative and party. Until so long as the party whip is not called, the MP must represent his or her district as a whole and not simply the party. He or she must learn to govern and not act as party worker when chosen as MP.

Towards strengthening and safeguard people’s sovereignty from mal-representation, the practice of holding local referenda may be considered to decide on local issues that the local legislature should give priority to and also, not least, to recall local politicians for breach of their code of conduct as judged voiced by a cross-section of the people of his constituency. Once the voice of the people has been so raised, the local council should vote on the issues presented to it. This will undoubtedly bring forth a new dimension to local governance, namely the dimension of ‘direct local democracy’ to enshrine a needed balance between the concepts of "people’s sovereignty" with " parliamentary sovereignty". This balance is specially required as we proceed with the philosophy and concept of the devolution of governance so as to make governments relevant to the day-to-day lives of the people; as also to make local government accessible, accountable, transparent and ethical. The practice of local referenda will safeguard ‘community sovereignty’ and ‘consumer sovereignty’, which are as vital for devolution as is ‘national sovereignty’.

Participation of the Poor through Social Mobilization

Past development strategies have failed the poor. Targeted projects and programmes have only served as political safety nets sponsored largely by the donor community. " Programmes that are initiated with the honest intentions of assisting the poor often lead to perverse outcomes...In Pakistan, for instance, it has been estimated that one in every ten schools is a ghost school…army has helped government unearth 50,000 teachers who were either ‘dummies or untraceable’…Leakages in the Integrated Rural Development Programme in India range from 20 to 50 per cent and are as high as 70 per cent in Bangladesh’s Rural Rationing (Rice) Programme…In India such programmes had the capacity to move only 4.5% of the total number of absolute poor out of poverty… 50-60% of the beneficiaries of the PDS have been non-poor" (HRD1999: P88-89).

From the point of view of protecting national interest and sovereignty the strategy of social mobilization of the poor is a better strategy of poverty eradication and one which can prevent the unnecessary encroachment of the World Bank and IMF on the sovereignty of developing countries under the banner of ‘good governance’. What happened to the strategy of ‘people’s participation’ in the form of the integrated rural development programmes (IRDPs) so dearly championed by the Bank and the donor community? Actually, it proved to be an unsustainable strategy which simply spread graft and corruption into the districts through so-called decentralization.

‘Civil society’ may best be defined as a community of people organized for promoting and protecting their human rights and civic duties. They should not be conceived as being co-terminus with private sector organizations motivated primarily by profit (HRD:1999).

Organzations of the poor are an essential dimension of civil society. They are necessary for a pro-poor democracy and sustainable development through self-reliant participation of the poor. Organizations of the poor, when formalized by law, lay the foundations for the poor’s right to freedom of thought, expression and information. They can be genuine community-based organizations (CBOs) for self-help that could be organized either on the principle of consensus or on the principle of one person-one-vote, as in co-operatives. Organizations of the poor will foster a culture of democracry and good followership in national politics.

In the past, these organizations have arisen as part of a social movement from within, as in the case of Sri Lanka’s Sarvodaya Sharamadana Movement led by A.T.Ariyaratne during the 1950s. Or as a social movement from without, as in the case of the leadership of Akthar Hameed Khan of Pakistan, who innovated the Comilla rural development experimentation in the 1960s: and , since the 1980s, inspired the AKRSP experimentation in rural development and local governance in the remote mountains of Pakistan, as well as undertaking his own Orangi project in Karachi for the organization of the urban ultra-poor in the 1980s.

For poverty eradication it is insufficient, albeit it necessary, to simply rely on the efforts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) no matter how innovative and dynamic they may be. This is because they can neither substitute the efforts of governments nor assume the form of CBOs. They are seen to be excessively reliant on foreign aid and so face the challenge of sustainability. Experience has shown that their self-reliance is dependent on their capacity to transform themselves as commercial organizations at which point in time they could lose sight of their mission as agents of civil society. Hence the lead role of the State is so vital for the success of social mobilization and the participation of the poor based on their own organizations.

This does not mean that NGOs have no role in civil society. On the contrary, they have a new role to play as neo-cosmopolitan agents of global change who mobilize human, technical and financial resources internationally and preach and practice globally just as TNCs engage in their business globally.

In this vision, NGOs are seen to be the harbingers of globalization through ‘glocalization’ and the protectors of human rights and cultural pluralism. South Asians all over should salute the genius of Mohammad Yunus who now seeks an expanded mission, namely to transfer micro-credit know-how and technology worldwide in the developing and developed countries alike. We await the success of Shoaib Sultan Khan as he seeks to empower local communities all over South Asia by linking local governance with the participation of the poor.

The success of this South Asian model can have great lessons for the developing and developed world in their search for community participation and meaning. Similarly, Ela Bhat’s Self-Employed Women’s Association of India, and Jaya Arunachalam’s Working Women’s Forum inspire all women in the region and outside to organize for their rights of gender and to unleash their entrepreneurial talents. Like Grameen and AKRSP they too should think of going regional and global with the support of the international community. It is their wisdom and technology that should be directly transferred around the world and not packaged as this donor or that donor’s success project for ‘replication’ elsewhere with their personnel. Greater diligence should be shown in respecting the intellectual property rights of South Asians by the donors.

Just how much reform is possible and likely in South Asia given the political, economic and social scenario painted by the HDR (1999) is a question worth asking? Ideally, a ‘first order reform’ must target the root cause of poverty, namely "targeting the economic and political structure that breeds and sustains poverty", as identified by Mahub ul Haq (HDR:1999 P89). Who is to bell the cat? How long do we wait for this to happen? How long can South Asia wait before the sub-continent blows up in violence, anger and frustration?

Therefore, it is proposed here that a "second order reform" based on the theory of social mobilization and community-based organizations of the poor may be the optimum strategy for a prosperous and peaceful South Asia and one that is just, dynamic and free from exploitation.

Other rationale for which one proposes the sponsoring of organizations of the poor are : (a) to access the government for their rights of entitlement; (b) to countervail the growing menance of corruption on the poor; (c) to ensure fair representation in local governments and combat the domination by the more powerful rural elite as is becoming obvious in the local Panchayats of India following the 73^rd and 74^th ammendments to the Constitution; (d) to have representation based on the principle of "organized merit" rather than "positive discrimination" which has the potential for politicization of Panchayats through political patronage through the creation of vote banks; and (e) not least, to increase the rate of economic growth through the participation of the poor as subjects of development in a spirit of genuine partnertship with the state, and the private sector Alas, for far too long we have been burdened with models of economic growth based on two sectors — the public and private sectors. Now let us incorporate a third — the sector of the poor

Empowerment of the Constitutional Heads of State for National Consensus Building (Including Governors of Federal States)

The grotesque power-play by the political parties all over South Asia,is to be witnessed in their inability to develop a political culture of consensus in favour of the politics of confrontation in Parliament, and on the streets. Even the repeated and costly process of elections and re-elections in search of political stability have not improved the quality of governance. Of late we are being haunted by the irony of political instability even when there is an absolute electoral majority because of the personality conflicts amongst the leadership causing potential break-up of political parties, as has happened most glaringly in the case of Nepal to involve intense, covert in-fighting between the Leader of the Parliamentary Party and the Party President.

The extremely unhealthy politicization of schools, universities, lower judiciary, bureaucracy, trade unions, and police-military establishments has caused severe threats to national unity.as civil society too is being overly politicized. Devolution and decentralization can lead to chaos and anarchy unless the civil society is completely de-politicized to go about serving their own mission and not those of the political parties for power.

Furthermore, there are limits to judicial activism. Too much activism of any kind gets mired in politics be they by the judiciary or civil society. Where judicial decisions are ignored by the implementing arms of the state great damage to the concept of the rule of law can occur. " In Pakistan the activist role of the Supreme Court in recent times has led to the confrontation with the executive…The clash between the executive and the judiciary saw the Chief Justice resign amidst mob attacks on the Supreme Court. The independence of the judiciary has since been severely damaged" (HDR:P68).

The principal that political issues should be settled politically should be held paramount, especially in the case of the dissolution of the legislature. This power should be vested in the Head of State subject to the advice of the Supreme Court and independent individuals.

Therefore, it is politically optimal to expand the frontiers of the authority of the constitutional Heads of State of South Asia in two broad spheres, (a) as a promoter and protector of civil society, and (b) the guardian for the independence of the executive leadership of constitutional bodies and commissions, and other core public institutions like the civil and security services. It should be underlined here that the principle of ownership of institutions would require that governors of federal states be persons of that state and not some persons with origins elsewhere, which is yet another legacy of the old imperial order in need of change.

In sum, one can conceive of the need for empowerment of the constituional heads of state for a variety of reasons: (a) to safeguard people’s sovereign rights through the instrumentality of referenda in order to balance parliamentary sovereignty with people’s sovereignty; (b) to protect the independence of the judiciary, commissions and executive heads of all services by appointing them for a fixed-term upon the recommendation of the appropriate institutions; (c) to improve the quality of public life through provision of wisdom, experience and foresight in Parliament by reforming the modality of representation to the upper chamber of the legislature so as to be able to effectively exert public accountability on the lower chamber and (d) to have free and fair elections conducted by a third party.

Conclusion

Economic growth must be made more broad-based and rapid if South Asia is to solve the multiple crises that the region is currently facing; and if democracy is to survive the onslaught of mal-governance. For this to happen social mobilization of the poor is a must in the interest of the larger public good. Only through the creation of organizations of the poor can democracy and development be meaningful for the poor.

Organizations of the poor can provide a demand-led model of development, which has so far alluded policymakers, donors and academics in search of good governance. The principles and concepts of accountability, transparency, participation and competition are difficult to uphold where development change is supply-led based on the model of delivery-by-the-state. Innovations must be found to make the poor become subjects of democracy and development and not be treated as objects of public welfare.

The yeti or missing link between democracy and development in South Asia are organizations of the poor with formal links to local governments, civil societies and the market. Through social mobilization, social peace, goodwill and harmony will be maximized together with economic growth. The empirical evidence of grassroots social mobilization is that the poor can contribute to growth in partnership with the public and private sectors. However, micro-level organizations of the poor need be linked judiciously with the meso-levels (districts,states) and also facilitated by the central or macro-level for their creation and nurturing through the lead role of the state through formulating pro-poor policies. It is argued that in this way growth, human development and equity can be simultaneously achieved. No need for "trade-offs" between these objectives, as in neoclassical economics.

‘Humane governance’ is what has been conceptualized by Mahbub ul Haq as the new requirement for dealing with the crisis of governance in South Asia (HRD:1999) Governance is said to be humane if it is ‘good’ in all of its its three dimensions concomittantly, namely (a) political, (b) economic, and (c) civil.

It is submitted here that adequate empowerment of civil society can be made only through its representation in the Upper Houses of the Parliaments of South Asia. For this, suitable electoral reforms are necessary to , on the one hand, ensure adequate representation of women, the poor, and minorities as well as, on the other hand, have the representation of the professional and intellectual communities to guide the nations of South Asia with a collective vision of sustainable development and participatory democracy. An Upper House so composed will, it is argues here, create the right balance between the politics of the short-run exigencies and crises with the need for a longer-term vision (Rana: 2000c).

South Asia must not blindly replicate western models of governance as the historical evolution of the South Asian states is unlike that of Europe. Our is ‘nations-within-states’ as opposed to Europe’s ‘nation-states’ born from the fragmentation of empire. In South Asia nation-states arose not from the ashes of empire but from their departure.

With inadequate political space being rendered to South Asia’s civil societies the threat of destabilization and instability is ever present given the vast expanse of its population and the enormous cultural diversity. Whereas human capital is best contributed by the leadership of the state, social capital can only be contributed by the individuals themselves and their families and communities. Just as the state must sponsor the formation of human capital so the state should facilitate the formation and development of social capital by nurturing organizations of the poor. Only through own organizations of the poor can the participate meaningfully at the grass roots of development and democracy.

Reforms are a vital must to arrest the crisis from mal-governance in South Asia. Many issues are paramount such as: where do we start? who will lead the reform movement ? what is the dynamic that will trigger reform, especially in an agenda of reforms as complex and comprehensive as that proposed by the Mahab ul Haq Centre (HRD:1999)?

How are we to initiate collective action by five important actors— civil society, media, committed political leaders, the academic community and international community? Who has been left out? Nobody, except for the poor themselves. Who is to be the prime mover for the desired reforms? South Asian nations will need their Napoleons to usher in such all embracing, idealistic reforms. Much more practical, therefore, to opt for the "second best" startegy based on the concept of social mobilization by calling on the goodwill of the caring and compassionate elite of South Asia to organize the poor for the good of all. Organization of the poor can thus be the dynamic for change as pressure is exerted from the grassroots by the poor themselves, and as local governments compete with each other for excellence of development and democratization results.

The international community needs to help in a positive way and not by aid but by trade and investment. Moving towards freer trade in agriculture for the globalization of agriculture would be the right international initiative for and on behalf the of the poor. The chains of global poverty can be unleashed through free and fair global trade in agriculture and primary products on which the poor are dependent. Permitting direct local cooperation between like-minded peoples and communities would usher in a new world of neo-cosmopolitanism of the 21^st century where people-to-people contacts rather state-to-state, as in the past, would harmonize globalization forces with the opportunities for grass roots’ democracy and development in a novel form of local participation, also referred to as ‘glocalization’.

The donor community must allow the developing countries to take initiative and ownership for the formulation of their own development paradigms, priorities and strategies. For this reforms through dismantling the vast statal and para-statal apparatus for the conceptualization and delivery of aid must be initiated by the bilateral donor communities as a matter of urgency.

Let aid be the domain of the people themselves be they poor, ultra-poor, middle class, rich or super rich. Let the United Nations be the global facilitator for this new form of international cooperation between the peoples the world over found on the concept of international voluntarism for social mobilization.

‘Participatory democracy’ is the missing link in fighting social exclusion and poverty.The link can be engineered through a process of social mobilization to nurture and create grassroots organizations of the poor and to link these at the level of local communities and districts to access local governments for their entitlement and to contribute to economic growth. It is also where ‘good’ leadership and ‘good’ followership meet in harmony for good governance in the interest of the greatest number in a context of a social environment of authoritarianism, patriarchy, mass illiteracy, poverty, deprivation and social dualism between the rich and the poor.

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